Bio-threat modeling and war-gaming

01Overview and value chain#

Markers EC: none — informs US national biodefense strategy | OECD: biotech-health, cross-cutting | Regulator: FDA (USA)

Bio-threat modeling and war-gaming simulates biological-threat scenarios — pandemic tabletop exercises, biodefense war-games, and structured risk assessment of emerging threats like AI-designed pathogens — to inform government policy, institutional preparedness, and research-governance decisions. This work is fundamentally advisory and analytical rather than a commercial product, and is dominated by a small number of academic biosecurity centers and policy think tanks rather than a broad vendor market with product pages. As of 2026 only one institution was confirmed with strong, on-topic evidence of an active bio-threat-modeling and exercise practice; several other named candidates (a biosurveillance company, a national laboratory) returned only generic academic papers that never actually named the specific candidate, a common false-confirmation pattern in this catalog area.

The key directions of bio-threat modeling and war-gaming are:

1. Pandemic tabletop exercises: structured scenario exercises that walk government or institutional participants through a simulated pandemic response, testing decision-making and coordination under realistic constraints.
2. AI-designed pathogen risk assessment: emerging analysis of the risk that AI tools could be used to design or enhance a biological threat, a rapidly developing 2026 policy concern.
3. Biodefense war-gaming: structured simulation of a deliberate biological-attack scenario to test national or institutional response capability.
4. Congressional and policy-briefing scenario discussions: interactive scenario sessions designed to inform legislators and policymakers on emerging biological-risk topics.

Sectoral value chain#

[Threat scenario design] ──> [Exercise/simulation execution] ──> [Participant response capture] ──> [Analysis]
                                                                            │
                                                                  (findings synthesis)
                                                                            │
                                                                            ▼
[Policy/preparedness recommendations] <─── [Report publication] <─────────┘

Value chain levels#

Cross-cutting technologies of the sector:

• Scenario-design methodology: structured approaches for building a realistic, policy-relevant biological-threat scenario.
• AI-risk assessment frameworks: emerging methodology for evaluating whether AI tools meaningfully increase biological-threat risk, a fast-moving 2026 policy area.
• Exercise facilitation infrastructure: the operational capability to run a multi-participant tabletop or simulation exercise and systematically capture its outputs.

02US#

The US is the only region with a confirmed dedicated institution, reflecting the concentration of this work in a small number of elite US academic biosecurity centers.

Pandemic exercises, AI-designed pathogen risk analysis#

• Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security: ran the SPARS 2017 (a coronavirus pandemic scenario exercise still referenced in current training materials) and its current Biosecurity Simulation Exercise (BSX) course, and published commentary on AI-designed viral genome governance in 2026 — confirmed via a RAND Corporation research report referencing its work, the center’s own LinkedIn posting on AI-designed pathogen risk, and independent coverage of its bioterrorism-preparedness history.

03CN#

No Chinese institution with a dedicated, confirmed bio-threat-modeling and war-gaming practice was found on a live screen. This is consistent with the field’s concentration in a small number of Western academic centers rather than a broad international vendor or institutional market.

No confirmed dedicated institution#

• Market context: this article found no Chinese institution with confirmed, on-topic evidence of a dedicated bio-threat-modeling and war-gaming practice.
• Reopen condition: if a Chinese institution with a confirmed bio-threat-modeling practice surfaces on a future screen, this section should be revised and the institution added to the table.

04EU#

No EU institution with a dedicated, confirmed bio-threat-modeling and war-gaming practice was found on a live screen at the same confirmation strength as the US anchor institution.

No confirmed dedicated institution#

• Market context: this article found no EU institution with confirmed, on-topic evidence of a dedicated bio-threat-modeling and war-gaming practice comparable to Johns Hopkins’ confirmed US evidence.
• Reopen condition: if an EU institution with a confirmed bio-threat-modeling practice surfaces on a future screen, this section should be revised and the institution added to the table.

05Leading companies and research institutes#

06Tech stack and innovations#

The category’s “technology” is scenario-design and exercise-facilitation methodology rather than a physical product, applied to an evolving set of biological-threat scenarios.

1. Scenario exercise design:
   • The SPARS 2017 coronavirus scenario, developed years before COVID-19, is still referenced as a training tool — reflecting how a well-designed scenario can remain relevant across multiple real-world biological events.
2. AI-biorisk governance analysis:
   • The center’s 2026 commentary on AI-designed viral genome governance addresses an emerging risk category — the possibility that generative AI tools could meaningfully lower the barrier to designing a dangerous pathogen — a topic with active 2026 congressional and policy attention.
3. Structured exercise facilitation:
   • The Biosecurity Simulation Exercise (BSX) course format applies structured facilitation methodology to walk participants through a realistic biosecurity scenario, systematically capturing decision-making gaps for later analysis.

07Value chains and production pipelines#

Industrial pipeline of a bio-threat tabletop exercise (informs US national biodefense strategy)#

┌───────────────────────────┐      ┌───────────────────────────┐
│ 1. Scenario design          │ ───> │ 2. Exercise/simulation execution │
└───────────────────────────┘      └───────────────────────────┘
                                                 │
                                                 ▼
┌───────────────────────────┐      ┌───────────────────────────┐
│ 4. Analysis                 │ <─── │ 3. Response capture        │
└───────────────────────────┘      └───────────────────────────┘
              │
              ▼
┌───────────────────────────┐      ┌───────────────────────────┐
│ 5. Report publication       │ ───> │ 6. Policy/preparedness recommendations │
└───────────────────────────┘      └───────────────────────────┘

Stage 1: Scenario design

A realistic biological-threat scenario is built, grounded in current epidemiological or biosecurity science — as with the SPARS 2017 coronavirus scenario.

Stage 2: Exercise/simulation execution

Government, institutional, or legislative participants work through the scenario in a structured session, such as the BSX course.

Stage 3: Response capture

Participant decisions, coordination gaps, and response times are systematically recorded during the exercise.

Stage 4: Analysis

Analysts assess the captured response for capability gaps and policy implications, including emerging risk categories like AI-designed pathogens.

Stage 5: Report publication

Findings are published for policymakers, institutions, or the public, such as the center’s commentary on AI-designed viral genome governance.

Stage 6: Policy/preparedness recommendations

Published findings feed into updated national biodefense policy or institutional preparedness planning.